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prove that the defendant's speed was unreasonable and improper under the
circumstances. Because there is a basic speed limit, the driver's speed may be
negligent even though he did not exceed the maximum or prima facie speed
limit.29
Burden of Proof in Criminal Trials
If a driver is cited for violation of the maximum speed limit, then the only
question is whether the driver did, in fact, exceed that limit.30 In cases where
the truck maximum speed limit has been violated there may be two questions
of fact: i.e., the speed, and whether the vehicle comes within the classification
set up by the statute.
31
When the prima facie speed limit is claimed to have been violated, the
situation in a criminal action is not so simple as that of exceeding the maximum
speed limit. In criminal trials, exceeding this limit is prima facie unlawful
by statute. 32 This means that the prosecution need only prove that the driver
did exceed a prima facie speed limit. Once this is proven, there is established
a violation of the basic rule as to reasonable and prudent speed.33
The driver, to escape conviction, must prove that his exceeding of the prima
facie speed limit did not constitute a violation of the basic speed law.34 He must
prove that his speed was reasonable and proper under the circumstances.
The speed of any vehicle, not in excess of the maximum speed limit or the
applicable prima facie limit, is lawful unless it is clearly proved to be in viola-
tion of the basic speed law.3 5 When a driver is cited for violation of the basic
speed law, then the burden is upon the prosecution to prove that the speed of
the vehicle was improper and unreasonable under the circumstances.
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THE EFFECT OF A PLEA OF GUILTY OR FORFEITURE
OF BAIL IN TRAFFIC OFFENSES
When a motorist is issued a citation in California for a violation of the
vehicle code, his rights may be altered in several unexpected ways. Signing
of the citation as required of the driver in all moving violations is not an
admission of guilt, but a promise to appear for judicial disposition of the
alleged infraction.' If the motorist fails to appear as promised the court of
jurisdiction is then required by statute to issue a warrant for his arrest within
'CAL. VEH. CODE § 40504.
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20 days.2 Of course, if the motorist chooses to appear and defend himself he
may do so.$
By far the more common course, however, is for the motorist to submit to
a small fine more or less in keeping with the gravity of the offense. 4 Submission
to such a fine may be by way of a plea of guilty5 or by forfeiture of bail.6 Th,
power of the magistrate with jurisdiction to fix bail, or to declare it forfeited,
is not limited to any enumerated violations.7 When a defendant who has posted
bail does not appear within the time of his promise, the magistrate "may de-
clare the bail forfeited and may in his discretion order that no further proceed-
ings be had in the case." 8 Presumably, a magistrate will insist that an offender
appear in court to answer any comparatively serious charge, but the vehicle
code seems to permit complete discretion in allowing forfeiture rather than a
plea.9 The right to forfeit bail as satisfaction of the penalty is discretionary
rather than absolute, so that a magistrate may order the defendant to appear
even though he has posted and forfeited bail.10 This discussion will be primarily
concerned with the subsequent effects of pleas of guilty and forfeitures of bail,
since minor violations are seldom defended.
Administrative Action
It is clear that a judgment or plea of guilty, or a forfeiture of bail, amounts
to a conclusive adjudication so far as administrative action is concerned."-
All of these procedures are termed "convictions" on a driver's record. The
job of the Department of Motor Vehicles, apart from issuing the original license
to drive, is to compile records on each driver in order to reappraise his fitness
to drive.' 2 Traffic courts are the main source of such records and a driver's
record of compliance with the vehicle code, as manifested in these reports, is
as relevant as a report on his eyesight or his driving ability. An operator's
license confers no vested right but is revocable for reasons and in the manner
provided by law.' 3 Thus, for its purposes, the department is not required to
distinguish a plea of guilty from a forfeiture of bail.
Criminal Proceedings
The effect of a plea of guilty or a forfeiture of bail on criminal proceedings
is not so clearly defined. The problem usually arises in criminal proceedings
under second offender statutes. Typical of this kind of statute is the one pro-
hibiting the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor.14 The purpose of the second offender clause is to make the
"' CAL. VEH. CODE § 40515.
'CAL. VEH. CODE § 40513.
'WARREN, TRAFFic CouRTs 57, 62 (1942).
'CAL. VEH. CODE: § 40513.
' CAL. VEH. CODE § 40512.
" CAL. VEEH. CODE §§ 40511, 40512.
'CAL. VEH. CODE § 40512.
Ibid.
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1 CAL. VEH. CODE § 13103.
12 CAL. VE. CODE §§ 12807, 12808, 12810.
"Sleeper v. Woodmansee, 1 Cal. App. 2d 595, 54 P.2d 519 (1936).
"' CAL VE. CODE § 23102.
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second punishment more severe. One who has entered a plea of guilty to a
previous violation of the same statute is obviously a second offender. Is one
who forfeited bail on a previous offense a second offender? For purposes of
increased criminal punishment he is not.'5 The vehicle code does not enumerate
any violation for which the magistrate may not fix bail and declare it forfeited
as an end to proceedings. Thus, where a magistrate in his discretion permits
forfeiture an accused offender may escape second offender punishment on a
subsequent violation by forfeiting bail on the first. In practice, it is usually the
Department of Motor Vehicles that compiles records of successive offenses and
"punishes" the multiple offender by suspending or revoking his operator's
license. 16
Civil Actions
The greatest difference in the effect of a plea of guilty, as distinguished from
a forfeiture of bail, occurs in cases where a civil action arises in connection
with a given statute violation. A plea of guilty to a vehicle code violation is
admissible in a civil action as an admission against interest.' 7 While a defendant
may offer an explanation of his prior plea of guilty, such as inability or unwill-
ingness to defend such a minor charge,' 8 the fact that he did plead guilty to a
violation of statute remains in the civil record. An admission against interest
does not have the weight of a judgment establishing the facts admitted, but its
weight remains a matter for the jury to consider in the light of all the circum-
stances, including the defendant's explanation.' 9 "It is well established that in
the absence of a plea of guilty, neither the judgment in a criminal action nor
the proceedings in connection therewith, such as arrest, is admissible in a civil
proceeding."'20 This position seems sound as a matter of general law. The
general rule is that a judgment in a contested criminal case is hearsay in a
subsequent civil action.21 A California statute providing that no record of con-
viction of any section of the vehicle code should be admissible in any civil
action was repealed without comment in 1957.22 Many cases so held without
relying on the statute, 23 and repeal seems to have wrought no change in the law.
A recent case, Mooren v. King,2 4 continues the traditional position that any
" People v. Rose, 63 Cal. App. 762, 219 Pac. 1043 (1923) ; Ex Parte Tung Fong, 59 Cal.
App. 499, 211 Pac. 32 (1922) ; 7 CAL. Ops. AT'y GEN. 143 (1946).
" Comment, California Traffic Law Administration, 12 STAN. L. REV. 388, 425, 437 (1960).
" Manning v. Watson, 108 Cal. App. 2d 705, 239 P.2d 688 (1952) ; Burbank v. McIntyre,
135 Cal. App. 482, 27 P.2d 400 (1933).
"8 Odian v. Habernicht, 133 Cal. App. 2d 201, 283 P.2d 756 (1955).
'9 !bid.
'o Rednall v. Thompson, 108 Cal. App. 2d 662, 666, 239 P.2d 693, 695 (1952) ; Accord,
Vaughn v. Jonas, 31 Cal. 2d 587, 191 P.2d 432 (1948) ; Manning v. Watson, 108 Cal. App. 2d
705, 239 P.2d 688 (1952).
"1 Rowe v. Such, 134 Cal. 573, 66 Pac. 862 (1901) ; Board of Education of the City of
Long Beach v. King, 82 Cal. App. 2d 857, 187 P.2d 427 (1947) ; Burbank v. McIntyre, 135
Cal. App. 482, 27 P.2d 400 (1933) ; McCosuuCK, EVIDENCE § 295 (1954) ; WITKIN, CALIFOR-
NIA EVIDENCE § 226 (1958).
2Cal. Stat. 1957 c. 1956 § 1, p. 3497.
"' E.g., note 20 supra.
" 182 Cal. App. 2d 546, 6 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1960).
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record of a conviction or forfeiture of bail is not admissible in a civil action,
but that a plea of guilty is admissible.
The influence of a plea of guilty to a vehicle code violation on a subsequent
civil action can not be over-emphasized. California courts, subject to certain
statutory exceptions, 2 5 have traditionally held an inexcusable violation of a
statute proximately causing damage to be negligence as a matter of law.26 This
ruling by a trial court is held not to be conclusive but to create a presumption
of negligence. The defendant may rebut this presumption; and, in fact, it is
fatal to his case not to do so. 27 Consequently, a prior plea of guilty admitted
as evidence in a civil action will, at the very least, lighten the plaintiff's burden
of proof by creating or helping to create a presumption of negligence.
The California system allowing forfeiture of bail in satisfaction of penalties
for vehicle code violations may at first glance seem arbitrary. It appears to
encourage an easy payment of money with no consideration of the merits of
the case. The offender may pay by mail, or through a friend.28 Bail is usually
set beforehand according to a schedule and may bear little relation to the circum-
stances of a specific violation. It may be either higher or lower than would be
a fine actually levied by a magistrate.29 Moreover, this system does little to
punish the violator. "Almost all violations bureaus are run mechanically and
tickets are paid for with the same attitude as a grocery purchase. The customary
procedure of the police officer or clerk is to look at the ticket and say, 'Two
Dollars,' issue a receipt and record the money."ao
On the positive side it must be said that forfeiture of bail in traffic offenses
has several advantages other than mere convenience. It affords the alleged
violator benefits analogous to the plea of nolo contendere. He may submit for
reasons of his own, such as guilt or convenience, to a penalty in the instant
action only. Like a plea of nolo contendere,31 a forfeiture is understood as
making no damaging admission which could be used against the violator in a
subsequent civil or criminal proceeding. A court may in its discretion refuse
to regard either procedure as a sufficient response from a defendant in the
criminal disposition of an offense.
" CAL. VET. CODE § 40831.
" Alarid v. Vanier, 50 Cal. 2d 617, 327 P.2d 897 (1958); Satterlee v. Orange Glenn
School Dist., 29 Cal. 2d 581, 177 P.2d 279 (1947) ; Grass v. Coast Transport, Inc., 154 Cal.
App. 2d 85, 315 P.2d 339 (1957).
" Coyle v. Alland & Co., 158 Cal. App. 2d 664, 323 P.2d 102 (1958).
21 WARREN, op. cit. supra, note 4 at 60, 64.
Ibid. at 62.
"WARREN, op. cit. supra, note 4 at 59.
"This plea is not used in California practice, but after its entry in a federal court the
California court was forced to consider its effect on California law in Caminetti v. Imperial
Mut. L. Ins. Co., 59 Cal. App. 2d 476, 139 P.2d 908 (1943) : "The existence in the law of the
two pleas, i.e., guilty and nolo contendere, is indicative of the fact that there is some distinc-
tion or difference between them. Undoubtedly the plea of nolo contendere is often used as a
substitute for a plea of guilty but it amounts only to a declaration by the defendant that he
will not contend. It has been held not to be a confession of guilt. . . .It is uniformly held
that such a plea cannot be used against the defendant as an admission in any civil suit for
the same act."
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The California position on admission of evidence of vehicle code violations
into subsequent civil actions seems to reflect the majority view in the United
States. 32 Short of an admission of guilt by a plea of guilty, no evidence of
prior convictions is allowed. Two sharply conflicting minority views make an
interesting contrast. The more sternly logical takes the position that a convic-
tion in a criminal action has required a finding of the pertinent facts of a
violation beyond a reasonable doubt, and should certainly be considered in a
civil action requiring a mere preponderance of evidence.3 3 However, the more
realistic of these minority views is reflected by a Pennsylvania statute34 which
makes pleas of nolo contendere, and even pleas of guilty, inadmissible in any
civil action. Such statutes proceed on the theory that a vigorous defense is so
seldom offered in traffic misdemeanors that any conviction in such matters has
little weight as to the defendant's absolute guilt.35
Conclusion
The contrast among these three general policies of admissibility is even
more striking when viewed from the standpoint of actual litigants. The defend-
ant may have entered a plea of guilty in the belief that its only consequence
was a ten dollar fine. He is shocked to learn that it is the basis for a damaging
admission in a civil action against him for many thousands of dollars. In certain
cases it even appears that the defendant believed that the signing of the ticket
at the scene of the accident was an admission of guilt, and that his later plea
in traffic court was a mere formality. The expense for a vigorous defense may
appear prohibitive in minor violations. Moreover, the criminal charge is nearly
always disposed of before the defendant realizes that a civil action will be brought
against him.
The plaintiff, on the other hand, is usually appalled when he learns that the
defendant may violate a statute, be issued a citation, acknowledge guilt by for-
feiting bail, and still exclude evidence of such a conviction from a civil action
for damages. This discovery must be especially galling to a plaintiff in states
where even a plea of guilty to vehicle code violations is not admissible in a
civil action. The plaintiff is driven, after considerable lapse of time, to establish
the violation by means independent of the citation and conviction.
Viewed in this context the California position appears to strike a good
compromise. Since the summary punishments meted out by traffic courts are
not considered reliable indices of guilt, they are excluded in a civil action
against the offender unless he has himself explicitly admitted guilt by entering
a plea of guilty.
Clay Haupert*
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